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Curbing The Dog of War: 
The War Powers Resolution 
DONALD E. KING* 
ARTHUR B. LEA VENS** 
We have already given in example 
one effectual check to the Dog of 
war by transferring the power of 
letting him loose from the Execu-
tive to the Legislative body, from 
those who are to spend to those 
who are to pay. 
-Thomas Jefferson 
INTRODUCTION 
America's long involvement in Vietnam marked the unhappy climax 
of a steady growth of independent presidential power to commit Ameri-
can forces to combat. Neither congressional nor public opposition 
proved capable of forcing an end to United States involvement in that 
conflict. Consequendy, Congress felt compelled to assert greater control 
over future United States military involvements. In 1973, over Presi-
dent Nixon's veto, the War Powers Resolution was enacted.1 
This article will develop a theory of the constitutional allocation of 
the war power and apply it to the provisions of the War Powers Resolu-
tion. Examination of the constitutional text and analysis of the respective 
·J.D. Harvard Univ. 1976, Member of the Virginia Bar. 
··J.D. Harvard Univ. 1976, Member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
I. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
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powers of the President and Congress will suggest the division of all 
United States military activity into three categories: "peacetime deploy-
ments," "war threatening actions," and "acts of war." It will be shown 
that military actions in the first category are controlled exclusively by 
the President, in the second are controlled both by the President and by 
Congress through political interaction, and in the third are implemented 
by the President but require congressional authorization to be con-
stitutionally valid. With respect to those uses of force requiring congres-
sional authorization, three types of authorization will be distinguished 
- express, implied, and presumed - each of which may in specified 
circumstances satisfy the constitutional requirement that Congress 
authorize acts of war. Finally, this constitutional theory will be applied 
to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. While it will be 
demonstrated that the Resolution suffers from a number of constitu-
tional infirmities, it will also be shown that certain aspects of the 
Resolution legitimately enhance Congress' ability to control war. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Despite the extensive treatment which the allocation of the war power 
receives in the Constitution,2 the complete constitutional scheme for 
that allocation is difficult to discern. Congress is expressly entrusted 
with the power to declare war3 and to establish and maintain the armed 
forces,4 and courts and commentators alike have taken this to mean 
that war must have some form of congressional authorization to be 
constitutionally valid.5 On the other hand, the President as Commander-
2. For a compendium of the various constitutional provisions relating to the war 
power, see the appendix to the district court's opinion in Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 
1013, 1020-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II. Note that this clause of the Constitution includes 
within congressional control the lesser forms of combat which are authorized by means 
of "Letters of Marque and Reprisal:' 
4. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cls. I, 12, 13, 15. Note not only Congress' power to 
provide for an army and navy, but also its analogous power to put the states' militia 
at the command of the President in cases of national emergency. 
5. Although many commentators during the Vietnam era disputed this assertion, see, 
e.g., Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 833 
(1972); Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REv. 19 (Special Issue 1970), few, 
if any, courts have taken seriously the idea that Congress need not authorize war. Su, 
e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973); DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 
II46, II56 (2d Cir. 1973); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
This issue thus seems resolved. For an extensive analysis of it, see Note, Congress, The 
President, and The Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. I771 (I968). 
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in-Chief has actual command of the armed forces6 and is thereby 
effectively empowered to order without congressional authorization 
military actions which might threaten or even provoke war. In their 
logical extension, therefore, the powers of Congress and of the President 
appear to conflict. This article will demonstrate, however, that this 
apparent conflict results not in clashes of authority which are beyond 
resolution but in a mutual limitation of the respective powers of Con-
gress and the President. 
The General Scheme 
Since only Congress can authorize United States participation in war, 
a threshold task is to ascertain the meaning of "war" as a constitutional 
term of art. The cases which have explored the issue have concluded 
that "war" means different things in different contexts.7 Only a few 
early courts addressed this definitional question in the context of 
determining the constitutionality of a particular use of force. These 
courts defined war in very sweeping terms,S including within its ambit, 
for example, the limited naval skirmishes between the United States 
and France from I798 to I800.9 This broad approach resulted from a 
formalistic view of warfare which recognized relatively few modes of 
international conflict,1° a view inadequate to comprehend the variety of 
modern uses of armed forceP 
6. U.s. CONST. art. II, § 2. Note that the armed forces assigned to the President's 
tactieal command include the militia of the states when they are ealled into the nation's 
service. 
7. For a good summary of the various contexts in which war has been defined see 
Note, supra note 5. 
8. E.g., Prize Cases, 67 U.s. (2 Black) 635, 666 (I862) ("War has been well defined 
to be, 'that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force.' "); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 
(4 Dall.) 37, 40 (I800) ("[E]very contention by force between two nations, in external 
matters, under the authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but public 
war."). 
9. E.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (I800). 
10. See Note, mpra note 5, at 1774. Compare with Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763,772 (I950). 
II. As early as 1853, a significant naval force consisting of four men-of-war was 
used to "encourage" the Japanese to negotiate a commercial treaty with the United 
States. American troops were very active in China and the Philippines at the turn of the 
century, insuring that United States trade interests were protected. And throughout the 
twentieth century the Marines have played varying roles in "stabilizing" Latin America, 
at one point fighting Communist-backed insurgents in Nicaragua for over seven years, 
from 1926 through 1933. 
More recently, Presidents have felt free to use shows of force to dissuade politieal or 
military actions inimieal to American interests. In 1961, President Kennedy ordered the 
Navy to take positions just off the coast of the Dominican Republic in order to discourage 
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A more limited concept of "war" emerges from the extensive litiga~ 
tion surrounding United States involvement in Vietnam. The courts 
which reviewed the Vietnam conflict held that it was a "war" in the 
constitutional sense, 12 but they did so only because that conflict exhibited 
two characteristics: first, the size and duration of the United States 
military commitment was great,1s and second, the United States military 
activity was directed against a foreign nation.14 
These two characteristics of the Vietnam conflict provide a starting 
point for defining "war" generally. For convenience sake, the size and 
duration of a military action will be referred to as its "magnitude" 
and the degree to which a military action is directed against the interests 
of another nation will be referred to as its "political content." ill 
The first of these two characteristics - the magnitude of commitment 
- was the focus of extensive treatment by the courts,16 and needs no 
further explanation. The second - the political content of the commit~ 
ment - was not expressly referred to by most Vietnam courts, but is 
implicit in their decisions given the recognized nature of the military 
the brothers of the late dictator Rafael Trujillo from staging a coup. Six years later, in 
1967, President Johnson stationed a large task force within fifty miles of the Syrian 
coast for the purpose of discouraging Soviet intervention in the Arab-Israeli War. See 
War Without Declaration, A Chronological List of 199 U.S. Military Hostilities Abroad 
Without a Declaration of War, 1796-1972, Il9 CONGo REC. SI4I74, SI4I78-SI4I81 
(July 20,1973) [hereinafter War Without Declaration]. 
12. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6Il, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973); DeCosta v. 
Laird, 471 F.2d Il46, Il56 (2d Cir. 1973); Orlando V. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). A few courts declined to determine whether war actually existed, 
holding that issue to be essentially a political question. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 
F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1971); Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846, 852 (D. Kan. 1968). 
13. See note 16 infra. 
14. Although United States Inilitary actions in Vietnam were characterized initially 
as assistance to South Vietnam, they were nevertheless directed against the Viet Cong 
and the North Vietnamese. See notes 17 and 18 infra. Generally, a use of force for the 
benefit of one government or political entity will be at the same time directed against 
the interests of another. 
15. The word nation is used loosely here. It should be construed to include not only 
established governments but also insurgent groups. Thus military actions directed 
against revolutionary forces could have a "political content" similar to actions directed 
against an established government. Generally, "political content" echoes, though it 
does not depend for its validity upon, the distinction in international law between 
humanitarian and other interventions. See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND TIlE UNITED 
NATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1973). 
16. E.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6Il, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (magnitude and 
duration of hostilities); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970) (prolonged 
Inilitary activity); Orlando V. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (magni· 
tude in size and duration); Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(number of men, number killed and wounded, amount of equipment and money ex· 
pended). 
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activity there in question.17 It is necessary to consider political content 
for an adequate definition of war because magnitude alone is insuf-
ficient. Large-scale military activity may be essentially peaceful while 
small-scale military activity may constitute war. For example, United 
States troop presence in Western Europe and United States naval 
presence throughout the world both involve large-scale prolonged 
commitments of men and materials but neither constitute war. Con-
versely, a single aircraft bombing raid on a foreign capital or a single 
battalion invasion of a small nation for the purpose of territorial 
expansion would involve a relatively small-scale use of force but would 
be so hostile as clearly to constitute war. 
This attempt to define war in terms of magnitude and political 
content is supported both by the intent of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion and by the practical realities of representative government.lS It was 
the intent of the Framers that massive economic and physical sacrifice 
by the nation in a military conflict be possible only with the approval of 
Congress, the branch of government most broadly representative of the 
will of the people,19 and it can be inferred that it was similarly their 
intent that the drastic moral and legal consequences of hostile action 
by the United States against another nation require the broad based 
support of congressional approval.20 In terms of the practical needs of 
representative government, a cosdy and bitter struggle cannot be waged 
17. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d II46 (2d Cir. 1973), where the military 
action reviewed by the court was the mining of Haiphong harbor. In addition, American 
courts which have defined "war" as a contest between sovereigns or between political 
entities implicitly recogni2e the significance of "political content." Prize Cases, 67 u.s. 
(2 Black) 635 (1862); Lewis v. Ludwick, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 368,373 (1869); Brown 
v. Hiatt, 4 F. Cas. 384, 388 (1870); Taffs v. U.S., 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953); 
U.S. v. Bortlik, 122 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Pa. 1954); Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 
255 F. 99, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800). 
18. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5, at 1775. 
19. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 318-19 (2d ed. 1937), 
where the Convention debated vesting Congress with the power to declare war. Although 
the debate was very brief, the comments of the Framers in combination with the easy 
passage of the Declare Clause make it plain that the Convention wanted to keep the 
power to initiate wars as close to the people as possible. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson wrote 
to James Madison after the Convention, saying, "We have already given in example one 
effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from 
the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are 
to pay." 15 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). Note also the comments of 
Alexander Hamilton, the leading advocate of executive power, where he argued that 
only Congress should have the power to initiate war. VII A. HAMILTON, WORKS 745-48 
(J. Hamilton ed. 1801), quoted in Note, The War-Making Powers: The Intentions of the 
Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 B.U.L. REv. 5, 15 (Special Issue 1970). 
20. See note 19 supra; see also Justice Taney's comments on the nature of the war 
power in Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614-15 (1850). 
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successfully by the government of a free society without the support of 
its people.21 
While the Vietnam cases indicate the two characteristics of military 
activity which are critical in the constitutional definition of war, they 
do not establish the precise point at which a particular use of force 
becomes sufficiently large-scale and sufficiently threatening to another 
nation to be considered war.22 Indeed, given the variety of military 
action and of circumstances calling for such action, specification of such 
a point is not possible. Uses of force do not divide neatly into those that 
are war and those that are not. Instead, all uses of force demonstrate 
some degree of both magnitude and political content. This is true of 
even the most innocuous military maneuver. For example, deployment 
of troops within the borders of the United States would certainly have 
some magnitude, and it equally would convey some message to the 
international community concerning American military or foreign 
policy intentions.23 With all uses of force reflecting both magnitude and 
political content, it follows that peacetime deployments shade imper-
ceptibly into actions which threaten war, and actions which threaten 
war shade in turn into acts of war. 
Since a precise definition of war is impossible, it becomes necessary to 
determine how the Constitution allocates control over those uses of 
force which are not so large-scale and so threatening to another nation 
as clearly to constitute war. A partial answer to this question is provided 
by delineation of those military actions so far removed from war that 
they are within the exclusive control of the President. 
As Commander-in-Chief the President has two types of command 
authority. The first is the authority to direct the military in time of war 
and the second is the authority to deploy troops during peacetime. The 
President's wartime command authority is beyond question24 and thus 
needs no elaboration, but his peacetime command authority raises some 
difficult questions and will therefore be explored in detail. Although 
there is virtually no case law on the subject,25 it seems clear from the 
21. See Note, supra note 5, at 1775. 
22. See note 12 Stlpra. 
23. In 1865, 50,000 troops were sent to the U.S.-Me.xican border to back up the 
protest by Secretary of State Seward of the presence of 25,000 French troops in Mexico. 
In February 1866, Seward demanded that a definite date for withdrawal be set and 
France complied. War Withom Declaration, supra note II, at 525068. 
24. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950); DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.zd 
II46, II54 (2d Cir. 1973). 
25. The only courts which even mention the President's command authority do so 
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text of the Constitution that the President may deploy and maneuver 
troops when the nation is not engaged in war. The Commander-in-Chief 
Clause makes no mention of war or peace, simply giving command of 
the nation's armed forces to the President. If the Framers had wanted 
to limit the President's use of force to times of war they could have 
done so through an express limitation such as that imposed on the 
States. Under the Constitution, States may only use force during times 
of actual invasion or "imminent danger as will not admit of delay." 26 
No such explicit limitation attaches to the President's authority. Indeed, 
the Framers of the Constitution realized that as long as a military 
force exists, in peace as well as in war, some branch of government 
must exercise command authority over it. It was as obvious to the 
Framers as it is today that the President is best suited to fill that role.27 
Peacetime command of the armed forces is therefore assigned to the 
President by the Constitution, both with respect to standing armed 
forces and with respect to militia in service of the national government.28 
It is this peacetime command authority of the President which 
creates the potential for conflict with the authority of Congress to control 
war, since a peacetime use of force might under certain circumstances 
threaten or even provoke war.29 This potential is enhanced by the 
practice of employing peacetime maneuvering of military forces as an 
integral tool of foreign policy.30 While the power over foreign affairs 
is nominally divided between the President and Congress,31 the institu-
very perfunctorily, usually with regard to wartime tactics. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 789 (1950); DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d II 46, II54 (2d Cir. 1973). 
Compare with Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970). 
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
27. See I M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at II2. See also Hamilton, The Federalist No. 
74, THE FEDERALIST 379 (M. Bcloff ed. 1948). For modern commentary noting the 
advantages of executive control of the military, see, e.g., Rostow, stlpra note 5. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Compare with Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); 
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1971). 
29. It is also possible that presidential selection of wartime "tactics" could impermis-
sibly expand the scope of an authorized war. The court in DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 
II46 (2d Cir. 1973), indicated that a radical change in character of the Vietnam War, 
such as indiscriminate bombing of civilians, might require separate congressional author-
ization. But the court rejected the plaintifFs claim that the 1972 mining of North Viet-
namese harbors was such a radical escalation that it necessitated specific approval by 
Congress, id. at II56. ' 
30. See examples cited stlpra note II. Some commentators have suggested that the 
foreign affairs powers and the war power are so integrally related that they cannot be 
meaningfully distinguished. See, e.g., Monaghan, sttpra note 5, at 33, where the Vietnam 
'Var is seen as "an instrument of presidential foreign policy." 
31. In the conduct of foreign affairs, the President is assigned a basically active role 
(appointing ambassadors, receiving foreign ministers and making treaties. U.S. CoNST. 
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tional advantages of the unitary executive over the legislature produce a 
recognized ascendency of the President in foreign affairs.32 Were there 
an unlimited presidential power to use the military as a tool of foreign 
policy, congressional control over war making would be rendered 
nugatory.33 Since the Framers could not have intended such a result, 
the scope of the President's peacetime command authority must be 
limited by the countervailing congressional power to control war. Thus 
the President has exclusive control only over those military actions 
which in no way threaten war, actions referred to hereafter as "peace-
time deployments." 
It is impossible to define peacetime deployments precisely just as it is 
impossible to define war precisely. However, as is the case with war, the 
considerations of magnitude and political content indicate those military 
actions which without question constitute peacetime deployments. Just 
as large-scale military actions which threaten another nation epitomize 
war, small-scale apolitical actions epitomize peacetime deployments. 
The latter are likely to involve very limited physical and economic 
sacrifice and similarly limited moral and legal consequences. The 
purposes which would be served by congressional approval in such 
cases are clearly outweighed by the value of presidential control over the 
tactics and strategies appropriate for achieving limited apolitical ob-
jectives. 
An example of a peacetime deployment might be the dispatch of a 
fleet to the North Atlantic for a NATO training exercise or of a detach-
ment of troops to protect an American Embassy in Europe from terror-
ists.34 Although both of these uses of force have some potential for 
art. II, § § 2, 3) while the Congress operates to oversee and limit the President (through 
appropriations. U.S. CoNST. art. I, §§ I, 7, and through the requirement that the Senate 
ratify treaties and approve ambassadorial appointments. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2). Con-
gress has an independent role, of course, in the regulation of foreign commerce. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8. 
32. From the earliest stages of American history, it has been recognized that the 
institutional advantages of the presidency effectively insure that the President would 
assume primacy over the conduct of foreign affairs. See Remarks of Justice Marshall 
delivered to the House of Representatives (1800), qtloted in United States v. Curtiss· 
Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). This view of the President's power 
has not diminished but rather grown in the context of modern times. In I936, the Supreme 
Court in Crlrtiss-Wright asserted, albeit in dictum, that "the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." 299 U.S. at 3I9. See also 
Monaghan, stlpra note 5, at 22. 
33. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. I970). 
34. A distinction should be made between terrorists like the Baader-Mienhoff Gang, 
who demonstrate no political connections, and terrorists like those of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, who have some afIiliation with a recognized or extant political 
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confrontation and the firing of shots, they are sufficiently small-scale 
and apolitical to constitute peacetime deployments under the exclusive 
control of the President. 
But few uses of the military are so clearly limited and apolitical. Most 
contain the seeds of broader conflict. These uses of force are neither 
peacetime deployments nor acts of war but instead constitute "war 
threatening actions." Figure I illustrates graphically these three cate-
gories of military activity. 
Directed Against 
Another Nation 
POLITICAL 
CONTENT 
Apolitical 
FIGURE I 
War 
Threatening 
Peacetime 
Deployments 
MAGNITUDE (a function of both scale and duration) 
) 
The large category of military acuvlty which constitutes "war 
threatening actions" includes most of the significant military activity 
in the past hundred years.35 It encompasses uses of force ranging from 
group. While a military operation against the former would be virtually apolitical, a use 
of force against the latter could conceivably have a very high political content. 
35. Of the 199 American military actions conducted without a declaration of war prior 
to 1973, fifty were for broad strategic aims, ranging from the protection of commerce 
in the Mediterranean to the forestalling of Japanese expansion into Russia after World 
War I. Eighty-two of these uses of force actually involved combat or ultimata, while 
ninety-seven lasted more than thirty days. War Withom Declaration, supra note II, at 
SI4182-S14184. Most of the uses of force which were of significant dimension and 
thus which represented genuine threats of war occurred during the period since the 
Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 18 
deployment of troops to a sensitive area such as the Congo in 1964,86 
through a blockade of a foreign nation like that of Cuba in 1962,87 to 
situations which involve some extended hostilities as in the 1965 
Dominican Republic action.3S In short, it includes any use of force 
which, in today's world, has a reasonable chance of provoking war 
but which is not of sufficient magnitude and political content to actually 
be war. 
Recognition of the broad category of war threatening actions neces-
sarily PoS€!S the problem of controlling such actions. As suggested in 
the foregoing analysis, congressional control of war and presidential 
command of the armed forces are, in their logical extension, mutually 
incompatible.39 Where these inconsistent aspects of the war power 
intersect, that is, in the control of those uses of force which are neither 
"acts of war" nor "peacetime deployments" the Constitution offers no 
principled resolution but only an invitation to political struggle.40 As 
the First Circuit noted in Massachusetts v. Laird,41 "the war power 
of the country is an amalgam of powers, some distinct and others less 
sharply limned." 42 Taken together these powers provide a "delicate 
fabric of checks and balances" 43 which serve as a framework within 
which the Congress and the President can test their relative political 
strength with regard to controlling a particular use of war threatening 
force. 
For example, the President might justify a complete blockade of Cuba 
under his Commander-in-Chief, foreign affairs and general executive 
powers, even where there is a high probability that war will result. 
While the Congress cannot direct or prevent the execution of mere 
peacetime deployments,44 the threat of war implicit in this blockade 
provides the Congress with constitutional authority to try to prevent or 
halt the blockade by utilizing the political means available to it, e.g., 
Civil War. For example, of the fifty actions for broad strategic aims, only cleven took 
place before 1880. This is not surpri$ing given the geographic extent of United States 
national interests in this period. 
36. !d. at 514181. 
37. !d. 
38. rd. 
39. See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970); Davi v. Laird, 318 
F. Supp. 478, 483 (W.D. Va. 1970). 
40. See Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 483 (W.D. Va. 1970). 
41. 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971). 
42. rd. at 31. 
43. Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 483 (W.D. Va. 1970). 
44. See text at notes 24-34 supra. 
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selective suspension of appropriations, joint resolution or even threat of 
impeachment.45 To take yet another example, if the President employed 
a naval show of force to deter Soviet intervention in a local conflict,46 
Congress would be well within its constitutional power to use similar 
means to bring to an end this show of force as long as there was a 
reasonable chance that the deployment would lead to war. 
This concept, which leaves to political struggle the determination of 
the particular outcome in an area of shared power, is not a novel one. 
It is most forcefully articulated in Justice Jackson's classic analytic 
approach to executive power in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.47 The opinion of the Court48 is a sweeping rejection of Presi-
dent Truman's asserted power to nationalize the nation's steel mills 
during the Korean War. Justice Jackson's concurrence, however, is 
more sensitive to the idea that presidential power cannot be viewed from 
a single perspective, but rather that its exercise can only be assessed in 
the context of relevant congressional action or inaction. 
Justice Jackson recognized that all presidential actions must logically 
take place in one of three circumstances. Presidential power to take 
such action, he reasoned, depends on which of the three circumstances 
obtains in the particular case. First, when a President acts with con-
gressional approval, either explicit or implicit, presidential power is at 
its height, the only limitation normally being whether the federal 
government as a whole is constitutionally authorized so to act.49 Second, 
when a President's action is in an area in which Congress has neither 
granted nor denied him authority, the President must rely on his inde-
pendent constitutional power to validate his action.50 Justice Jackson 
here recognized that there exist certain "twilight" areas where the 
constitutional allocation of power between the President and Congress 
is imprecise or concurrent, and that in these "twilight" areas congres-
sional inaction might as a practical matter expand the permissible scope 
45. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 33-34 (1St eir. 1971); Orlando v. 
Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1018-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 
483-84 (\V.D. Va. 1970). 
46. This is, in fact, precisely the action taken by President Johnson in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli 'Var. See War Without Declaration, supra note II, at S14181. 
47· 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
48. Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court, but his opinion was accompanied 
by concurring opinions from each of the Justices who formed the six to three majority. 
49· Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1951) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
50. [d. at 637. 
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of executive authority.lSl Third, where a President's act is clearly incom-
patible with the express will of Congress, presidential action under this 
circumstance is not constitutionally valid unless it is supported solely 
by the President's independent power minus any authority which the 
Constitution allocates to Congress over the matter.52 Justice Jackson 
asserted that in this category, the President's power is at its "lowest 
ebb." 53 
Analyzing the constitutional allocation of control over war threaten-
ing actions in terms of Justice Jackson's framework, when the President 
acts unilaterally to utilize war threatening force, he is acting within 
Justice Jackson's "twilight" area of concurrent authority, and absent 
congressional opposition, is constitutionally entitled to take the action.1i4 
If Congress responds with opposition in such a situation, that opposition 
will not conclusively bind the President. Rather, as Justice Jackson said, 
"in this area [of concurrent authority], any actual test of power is 
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary im-
ponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." 55 
During such a "test of power" the most effective weapon which 
Congress can employ, and therefore the most likely to be used, is the 
appropriations power.56 While war threatening actions are not consti-
tutionally invalid merely because they lack congressional authorization,51 
5I. ld. 
52. ld. at 637-38. 
53. ld. at 637. Justice Jackson'S three categories can be applied to analyze the consti-
tutionality of any presidential action. They are not delineations of a particular substantive 
allocation of constitutional authority as is the tripartite analysis of the war pOWers pre-
sented in this article. The two should not be confused. 
54. The court in Massachusetts v. Laird, 45I F.2d 26, 34 (ISt Cir. I97I), specifically 
reserved judgement on the issue of whether the President can validly exercise a shared 
war power in the face of congressional silence, holding that Congress had clearly partici-
pated in the decision to fight in Vietnam. However, it seems clear from Justice Jack-
son's analysis in Youngstown and from cases which have actually dealt with presidential 
acts in the face of congressional silence, that such acts are valid so long as they do not 
impinge on an exclusive congressional power. Of course, Justice Jackson was not dealing 
with a case in Youngstown where Congress had been silent and thus his assertions are 
dictum. But, for example, in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914), 
the Supreme Court uphcld a President's unilateral act essentially on the ground that 
Congress had not opposed that act. 
55. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1951). 
56. It should be noted that in dealing with appropriations for armed forces, the 
Constitution contains a special provision which limits those appropriations to two years, 
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cI. I2. This special provision has been widely read as empha-
sizing the intent of the Framers that Congress use the appropriations power to control 
executive uses of force. See Note, The Appropriations Power as a Tool 0/ Congressional 
Foreign Policy Making, 50 B.U.L. REv. 34, 40 (Special Issue 1970) for a good summary 
of that position. 
57. See text at notes 39-46 supra. 
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Congress can make the prosecution of such actions impossible by cutting 
off appropriations which support them.58 This indirect method of 
proscribing war threatening uses of force may appear to be inconsistent 
with Congress's inability directly to order their termination, but an 
analysis of the two powers reveals that they are very different in their 
exercise and in their impact. 
First, an order to stop a particular military action would be easier to 
draft and enact than an appropriations cut-off to accomplish the same 
objective. An order to halt contested activities could be phrased in 
general terms, leaving to the President the difficulties of actually dis-
engaging American forces. In contrast, an appropriations limitation 
would have to define the specific amounts which the President could 
spend and the particular activities on which the money could be spent 
if it were to have the desired effect on the President's actions. Any less 
specific limitation of funds such as one which simply directed the 
President not to spend more money in conjunction with a particular 
use of force would make it impossible for the President to conduct a 
withdrawal. Indeed, Congress demonstrated the truth of this proposi-
tion when it expressed its opposition to the Vietnam War with its 
repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1970, but continued to fund 
the war until its conclusion in 1973.59 
The second and perhaps more important difference between the two 
approaches to halting war threatening military activity is that appropria-
tion limits are subject to presidential veto whereas resolutions ordering 
the halt of a particular use of force are not. Thus, where the President 
desires to continue a specific use of war threatening force, a two-thirds 
majority in Congress is effectively required to limit or cut off appropria-
tions supporting that action. If such a two-thirds majority is not attain-
able, Congress must either accede to the President's actions or refuse to 
pass any appropriations at all until a suitable compromise is arranged.6o 
58. See note 45 supra. 
59. As noted, the Constitution specifically limits appropriations for the armed forces 
to two years. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 12. The idea that this was to be an operative 
check on the President is borne out by the Constitutional Debates. The Framers were 
concerned about the danger of giving the President control of a standing army and 
consequendy a limitation on its size was proposed. This was not, however, adopted 
because it was ultimately decided that the best protection against executive abuse was the 
limiting of appropriations. 2 M. FARRAND, mpra note 19, at 330. Drinan v. Nixon, 364 
F. Supp. 854, 862 (D. Mass. 1973), indicates that a cut-off of funding for the 1973 
bombing of Cambodia could well have been a valid way to stop that action. 
60. See DeCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369 (2d Crr. 1971). As the court in 
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) noted, congressmen opposed to 
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This is the epitome of political "struggle" and highlights the difference 
between the direct and indirect methods of restricting uses of armed 
force.61 
To summarize the constitutional scheme for allocating the war power, 
the Constitution assigns to the President exclusive control over peace· 
time deployments while requiring some form of congressional authori· 
zation for war. Neither war nor peacetime deployments are self-limiting 
concepts, however; thus, the power of Congress and the President clash 
in that broad range of military activity which is neither clearly war· 
making nor clearly peacetime deployments. In this middle category of 
war threatening actions, control is determined not according to legal 
formulae but by political struggle between Congress and the President. 
Forms of Congressional Authorization 
This analysis of the war powers began with a focus on the require. 
ment that war receive some form of congressional authorization to be 
constitutionally valid. It is time now to examine the forms which con-
gressional authorization of war can take. They are threefold: express, 
implied, and presumed. 
Express authorization needs little elaboration. It may consist of a 
formal declaration of war or of a simple statutory authorization.62 The 
provisions of a treaty, however, cannot constitute express authorization 
since only the Senate participates in treaty ratification.63 
Implied authorization may take many forms. Virtually every court 
the war continued to vote for the appropriations supporting it simply to avoid abandon-
ing the men engaged in combat. Congress did attempt an appropriation cut-off of the 
I973 Cambodia bombing, but that was a case where sudden disengagement would not 
have exposed American troops to any danger. See Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. 
Mass. I973) for a summation of that congressional action. 
6I. See Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. at 860-64 (D. Mass. I973) for an interesting 
account of the political impact and resulting compromise involved in President Nixon's 
veto of Congress' attempt to cut off appropriations for the 1973 Cambodia bombing. 
By applying political pressure through this action, Congress was able to force the end 
of the bombing despite its inability to pass the actual appropriation measure over the Presi-
dent's veto. 
62. See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-41, 43, 45 (1800) (holding that 
Congress authori2ed the undeclared naval "war" with France). 
63. The Framers considered giving the Senate the power to declare war. 2 M. FARRAND, 
stlpra note 19, at 250-53, but ultimately decided that that power should be vested in 
the full Congress. Id. at 318-19. Further, it is well established that if a war were 
conducted under the auspices of a treaty, congressional opposition to the war would 
nullify the treaty authomation. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese 
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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that reviewed the Vietnam War took a very broad view of what consti-
tutes adequate congressional authorization, holding that the particular 
method chosen is a matter for congressional discretion and that contin-
uation of appropriations and of the selective service system was a suf-
ficient expression of congressional approval to support the President's 
actions.64 Thus, if Congress wishes to withhold authorization of a war 
it must do so unequivocally. 
The third category of congressional authorization - presumed 
authorization - involves a novel approach and thus merits extended 
analysis. There are two types of presumed congressional authorization 
of war. They arise in situations which are analytically distinct and thus 
each deserves special attention. Both types of presumed authorization, 
however, derive from the fact that Congress in supplying the President 
with armed forces has given him the ability to respond to emergencies. 
The first type of presumed congressional authorization of war arises 
in the event of attack or threat of imminent attack on the territory of 
the fifty states. Although the Framers wanted to give the Congress 
virtually total control over the authorization of war, they also recognized 
that war might well be forced on the United States by an invading 
enemy and that the President was far better equipped than Congress to 
defend against invasion.65 Therefore, the original draft of the Constitu-
tion66 was changed to empower Congress to "declare war" instead of 
64. E.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971); Massachusetts v. 
Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971). While it is true that the Vietnam conflict was 
initially approved by Congress in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, courts continued to hold 
that congressional appropriations and continuation of the sdective service system consti-
tuted authorization of the war, even after the Resolution was repealed in 1970. See 
DeCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369 (2d Cir. 1971). Two courts did, however, hold 
that the Vietnam \Var was not authorized by Congress and that it was therefore unconsti-
tutional. See Mitchdl v. Laird, 488 F.2d 61I, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding appropria-
tion vote not equivalent of approval of war in view of the danger to American troops 
which a cut-off would pose); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 563 (E.n.N.Y. 
1973), rev'd on otlIer grounds, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that post peace 
treaty bombing in Cambodia not authorized by general Vietnam military appropriations). 
65. Alexander Hamilton, perhaps the most prominent supporter of a strong executive, 
argued forcefully that the conduct of war, whether it was initiated by a hostile attack 
on the United States or was declared by Congress, was exclusivdy the province of the 
President. Hamilton, $tIpra note 27, at 379-80. Under his proposed version of the 
Constitution, the President would have had explicit power to engage in war which was 
begun by another nation. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 292. Even George Mason, who 
advoeated circumscribing executive power by having a three-person executive council 
instead of a single executive, conceded that one of the main advantages of a unitary 
executive was the speed, energy and secrecy with which he could conduct war. 1 M. 
FARRAND, $tIpra note 19, at II2. 
66. The Committee of Detail subtnitted a first draft of the proposed Constitution in 
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"make war," after a debate which made it clear that the Framers in-
tended the President to have the "power to repel sudden attacks." 01 By 
establishing and maintaining the armed forces during a time of peace08 
and thus subjecting them to the President's command authority,OO the 
Congress can be presumed to have authorized their use in defending 
the territory of the United States itself. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a 
more appropriate or legitimate use for a standing army. No court has 
ever questioned such a use of force by a President, notwithstanding the 
absence of express or even implied congressional authorization for 
the specific action taken.10 
In fact, there is much which suggests not only that congressional 
authorization of the defense of American soil may be presumed, but also 
that such a presumption is constitutionally irrebutable and that the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, has a duty to act on that authoriza-
tion. In the Prize Cases/1 cases challenging President Lincoln's blockade 
of Confederate ports without express or implied congressional authori-
zation, the Supreme Court upheld the President's action saying, "[i]f a 
war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only 
authorized but bound to resist force by force." 12 Although this language 
in the Prize Cases is dictum since the cases involved insurrection not 
invasion and since Congress later ratified the blockade,13 the Court's 
position that a President who has been provided by Congress with 
armed forces74 has a duty to defend the nation's sovereignty has consti-
tutional roots beyond the "establish and maintain" armed forces and 
"Commander-in-Chief" clauses. Article IV, Section 4 (the Guarantee 
Clause) of the Constitution requires the United States to "protect each 
of [the States] against Invasion .... " 15 This constitutional obligation 
late July, I787. This draft incorporated the Convention's work for the first two months. 
According to its provisions, Congress had the power to "make war." 2 M. FARRAND, 
supra note I9, at I68. 
67. ]d. at 3I8. 
68. See note 4 mpra. 
69. See note 6 supra. 
70. See, e.g., Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (I982), which contain perhaps 
the most ringing judicial endorsement of such a use of force, although arguably in dictum. 
Unquestioning recognition of the legitimacy of unilateral use of force by a President in 
defense against an attack on the United States continued through the relatively recent 
Vietnam cases. See e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II, 6I3 (D.C. Cir. I973). 
7I. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (I862). 
72. ld. at 668. 
73. ]d. at 67I. 
74. Either in the form of a standing army or in the form of state militia activated for 
federal service. 
75. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 4. 
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of the United States obviates the need for a congressional determina-
tion of the appropriateness of war if a State is invaded. The President, 
as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces provided by Congress, is 
constitutionally presumed to have been authorized to respond to the 
attack and is automatically under an obligation to determine what 
response to the invasion is tactically appropriate. While it is conceivable 
that for tactical reasons defense of a particular State might be unwise or 
impossible and that this obligation could not be fulfilled, it is the Presi-
dent, as Commander-in-Chief, not the Congress, who must make such 
an assessment because these decisions are clearly questions of wartime 
tactics. Thus the presumed authorization is irrebuttable. 
This authorization of the President to defend against actual attacks 
on the nation naturally includes authorization to defend against the 
threat of imminent attack. Such an extension is clearly necessary in 
the technologically shrunken world of the twentieth century, but even 
in the early l8oo's the power of the President to respond to "imminent 
danger of invasion" was recognized.76 While this would not justify 
fighting the Communists in Vietnam to avoid fighting them in Cali-
fornia, it would surely justify intercepting enemy bombers bound for 
American shores. The limiting principle here is simply that the nation 
must be actually under attack or about to be attacked.77 
This irrebuttable presumption of authorization is not, of course, a 
license which would allow the President to respond to a border skirmish 
with a massive offensive invasion. The presumed authorization is based 
on an obligation to defend the States; while it does not require the 
President to halt operations at the border, neither does it allow him to 
go beyond those measures necessary to reestablish the nation's security. 
The second presumption of congressional authorization of war arises 
in the event of a threat to the interests of the United States which is so 
grave that Congress clearly would approve of war but is unable to do so 
76. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29 (1827). This case involved a challenge 
by a New York militiaman to the President's power during the War of 1812 to activate the 
militia before the British had actually invaded. In an opinion by Justice Story, the Supreme 
Court held the constitutional power to repel invasions included the authority to "provide 
for cases of imminent danger of invasion, as well as for cases where an invasion has 
actually taken place." ld. at 29. 
77. "About to be attacked" should, of course, be read very narrowly. It would not, 
for example, include a ground or naval attack on Canada or Great Britain, although it 
could conceivably cover' a missile attack against those allies. Generally, if there is any 
doubt concerning the possibility of attack on the United States itself, entrance into war 
is not required by the Constitution, but is discretionary. Such situations give rise to the 
second type of presumed congressional authorization. See text at note 78 intra. 
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within the time available for decision. In today's world of virtually 
instantaneous communications and weapons delivery, threats to United 
States interests can easily be imagined which require immediate military 
response even though they do not involve attacks on the United 
States itself.78 If Congress cannot act within the period required to 
defend the nation's interests but may safely be presumed to desire that 
these interests be protected by military action, if necessary, there is no 
reason for the President to refrain from taking the required action. 
However, since presidential power in this situation rests solely upon a 
presumption that Congress would have authorized war if time to 
consider the situation had been available, the presumption of authoriza-
tion evaporates once Congress has had the time necessary to make 
an informed decision. If Congress then disapproves of the war already 
initiated by the President, it can compel him to terminate American 
participation in the conflict.79 Thus, in contrast to the first type of pre-
sumed authorization, the presumption of authorization in grave threat 
situations is rebuttable. 
Presumed authorization of war in grave threat situations is not 
explicidy recognized in the early cases which consider the war power.so 
Three early Supreme Court cases dealt with the legal status of ships 
captured during the early nineteenth century American-French naval 
conflicts and each involved an interpretation of Congress' express 
authorization of the hostilities. None discussed the possibility of 
emergency action by the President on the basis of presumed authoriza-
78. Indeed, there has evolved in the years following World War n a theory of collec-
tive self-defense under which nations with various common national interests have 
united themselves against nations perceived as common enemies. See Note, slIpra note 5, 
at 1782-84. Much of this collective self-defense has been manifested in multilateral defense 
agreements or treaties, whereby the signatories agree to treat an attack on any party as 
an attack on all parties. See examples cited in Note, Stlpra note 5, at 1782-83. While it is 
highly doubtful that any of these treaties could be construed as advance congressional 
approval of war thereby binding the United States to respond to an attack on an ally, the 
fact that such agreements are common suggests that both the President and the Senate 
at various times have agreed that certain American interests abroad are so vital to the 
nation's security that they merit military protection. 
79. There are, to be sure, many problems with enforcing such a withdrawal order, 
given the foreign policy and military problems which the unauthorized use of force would 
itself create. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6Il, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973), holding that the 
issue of whether or not President Ni.xon's actions in Vietnam constituted withdrawal was 
a political question. These problems will be discussed further below. See note 154 infra. 
80. Only five cases before 1850 actually dealt with the war power. See Bas v. Tingy, 
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I (1801); Litde v. 
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 
(1827); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. Il92 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
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tion.81 One early Circuit Court opinion involving an incident in Spanish 
Florida does imply that the President cannot make war without express 
congressional authorization in any situation except an actual invasion 
of the United States.82 But the case did not involve an emergency 
situation in which Congress was unable to act and the apparent sweep-
ing prohibition of presumed authorization of war in such situations is 
merely dictum. 
The failure of these early cases to recognize presumed congressional 
authorization of war in grave threat situations could also be explained 
by the fact that at the time they were decided, only an invasion could 
actually threaten the vital interests of the United States. However, in 
the modern world "the difference between safety and cataclysm can be a 
matter of hours or even minutes," 83 and, not surprisingly, modern 
courts have recognized the possibility of a rebuttable presumption of 
congressional authorization, although it has never been so labelled. 
The Vietnam War was, of course, the catalyst for virtually all of the 
modern judicial review of the war powers. By the time the first lawsuits 
challenging the war actually came before the courts, Americans had 
81. The question in Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800), and in Talbot v. 
Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I (1801), was whether the United States and France were 
at war, thus justifying the capture of vessels under French control. The Court recognized 
that no formal declaration of war had been made, but held that Congress had authorized 
a limited war which would support the captures. There was therefore no need for the 
Court to consider the independent power of the President to order such seizures on the 
basis of presumed authorization. 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), on the other hand, held that the 
President was without authority to order the seizure of the ship there in question. How-
ever, Little did not involve the capture of a French vessel as a war prize, but rather 
concerned the seizure of what was thought to be an American ship trading with France 
in violation of the Non-Intervention Act. In spite of the fact that Little has been cited as 
relevant to the war power, see, e.g., Rostow, Sflpra note 24, at 856-57, it is really a case 
which circumscribes the President's power to seize American property during a national 
emergency. Like Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951), which, 
as noted earlier, also dealt with emergency domestic seizures during wartime, Little 
actually has very little to say about the President's authority to make war in an emer-
gency. In addition, even if Little had addressed the question of emergency authorization 
of war its objection to the President's actions was based on their violation of congressional 
legislation not on the absence of congressional authorization. 
82. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. II92, 1230-31 (C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
This case has virtually no precedential value, never having been cited in any subsequent 
case. Further, its statements concerning war power were expressly predicated on a "mani-
fest distinction between our going to war with a nation at peace, and a war being made 
against us by an actual invasion, or a formal declaration." ld. Such a dichotomy is 
clearly invalid in the modern world. 
83· Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Centtlry Under an 18th Century 
Constitution, 47 CoRNELL L.Q. I, 3 (1961). 
74 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 18 
been heavily involved in the fighting for at least four years,84 and 
virtually no one was maintaining that the war could be justified on the 
basis of presumed authorization.85 Nevertheless, some courts have 
examined presumed authorization, although in a somewhat cursory 
manner and under the label of emergency power.S6 While not clearly 
defining this form of authorization, they have recognized its existence, 
both in its irrebuttable and rebuttable aspects.87 A typical example is 
the following passage from Mitchell v. Laird:88 
Without at this point exhaustively considering all possibilities, we 
are unanimously of the opinion that there are some types of war 
which, without Congressional approval, the President may begin to 
wage: for example, he may respond immediately without such 
approval to a belligerent attack, or in a grave emergency he may, 
without Congressional approval, take the initiative to wage war. 
Otherwise the nation would be paralyzed. Before Congress could 
act the nation might be defeated or at least crippled. In such un-
usual situations necessity confers the requisite authority upon the 
President. Any other construction of the Constitution would make 
it sel£-destructive.89 
It seems clear that in a world made small by modern communications 
and weapons technology, the multitude of circumstances which would 
conceivably threaten vital national security interests necessitates the 
recognition of a presumed though rebuttable congressional authoriza-
84. United States military assistance to South Vietnam in the form of training and 
advising began almost immediately after the French withdrew in 1954. It was steadily 
expanded and by 1962 fully 12,000 uniformed American advisors were in Vietnam. War 
Withotlt Declaration, stlpra note II, at S14181. The earliest lawsuits challenging the 
war cliort were not heard at the district court level until 1966, at least four years after the 
heavy personnel commitment commenced and fully two years after the initiation of open 
American involvement in combat. E.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 
1966), affd 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cerl. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967)· 
85. Bm see Department of State, The Legality of u.s. Participation in the Defense of 
Vietnam, 75 YALE L.J. 1084, IIOO-Ol (1966). 
86. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) where the 
court held that the war cliort clearly needed congressional approval and thus felt no 
necessity to determine whether the President could initiate war in any but pure defensive 
situations. 
87. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. 
Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1971); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854,859 (D. Mass. 
1973). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1951) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 430 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
88. 488 F.2d at 613-14. 
89. While the court did not specifically qualify its use of "congressional approval" as 
express or implied, this is because the conceptualization of emergency war power as 
presumptively authorized by Congress has not been heretofore articulated. This concept, 
although novel, accurately reflects the Constitution's allocation of the war power. 
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tion of the President to act in situations which defy a more specific 
definition than "grave emergencies." 00 
This recognition of a rebuttable presumption of authorization to 
make war is as dangerous as it is inevitable. The limits on the power 
are simply that Congress not have time to act and that the United 
States' interests at stake be so vital that Congress would in all probability 
have approved the President's actions if time had been available. These 
are not clear limits such as those which apply to the case of the irre-
buttable presumption of authorization which can arise only in the event 
of an attack or imminent attack on the United States itself. Since a 
myriad of circumstances might require emergency action for the protec-
tion of "vital" interests, a catalog specifically defining all such circum-
stances is impossible to construct. Thus, Congress can rebut presump-
tions of authorization only by responding in an ad hoc manner to each 
situation which might call for their invocation. This has led commenta-
tors such as Professor Eugene Rostow and Senator William Fulbright 
to suggest that modern Presidents possess virtually limitless power to 
conduct war.91 
Such a suggestion, however, overstates the President's power for two 
reasons. First, genuine emergencies that would justify actually making 
war before going to Congress for express authorization will be very rare 
and probably very dramatic. An example might be a sudden Soviet 
invasion of Western Europe. In such situations the drastic nature of the 
actions involved will serve to insure that the President act in good faith, 
making war only when he is confident of subsequent congressional 
support. Second, if the President should ever wrongly presume con' 
gressional authorization, Congress can quickly order him to terminate 
his actions since the presumption is valid only so long as Congress has 
been unable to act. Once Congress has expressed opposition to the 
President's actions his authority to continue them ceases.02 
90. 'Vhat constitutes a "grave emergency" is, of course, very difficult to say. But the 
problem is not as critical as it first appears, for if the Congress disagrees with the 
President's assessment of a particular situation, it can order his withdrawal. See text at 
note 92 infra. 
91. See Rostow, supra note 5; Fulbright, stlpra note 83. 
92. It has been forcefully suggested by both courts and commentators that the Presi-
dent's institutional advantage over Congress in dealing with sensitive information 
provides constitutional justification for the President's continuance of war making in the 
face of congressional opposition. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Water-
man 5.5. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, III (1948). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See generally Rostow, supra note 5; Monaghan, supra 
note 5; Fulbright, supra note 83. If such a contention is supported merely by the Presi-
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Of course, there still remains the problem that a war once started is 
difficult to end.93 That problem is not solved, however, by forbidding 
the President to initiate war in emergencies while at the same time 
entrusting the President with command of the armed forces. As long 
as he has the ability to order troops to war, the possibility of his abusing 
his power and the problem of terminating an improperly initiated war 
will exist. The only real check against such an abuse is a strong and 
vigilant Congress that makes clear to the President what it will tolerate 
and what it will not. This is precisely what the Congress was attempt· 
ing to accomplish when it enacted the War Powers Resolution. 
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF I973 
The War Powers Resolution of I97394 attempts to maximize Con· 
dent's greater access to this information, it loses all force at the point when Congress 
becomes sufficiently well informed to make a decision in a particular case of war making. 
Since Congress is the branch best suited to determine when it has overcome that "informa· 
tion gap," a good faith assertion by Congress that it has made an informed decision to 
terminate presidential war making should be conclusive. See Cox, The Role of Congress 
in Constittltional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 221 (1971). 
If it is further argued that the inability of Congress to safeguard sensitive information 
justifies presidential war making based on information withheld from Congress, the 
analysis is different, but the result is the same. Courts have indicated that the President 
justifiably might withhold certain foreign affairs information from the judicial branch on 
a competency rationale. E.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3rd Cir. 1974). Bm s~e Zwiebon v. Mitchell, 
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (requiring prior judicial approval of foreign intelligence 
wiretaps). But no such rationale would support the President's withholding such informa-
tion from Congress, given its constitutional role in decision·making involving military 
and foreign affairs. Concern over congressional handling of sensitive material is certainly 
well founded, an example of Congress' inability to insure continued secrecy of sensitive 
information being the celebrated leak by the House of Representatives of classified infor-
mation related to the Central Intelligence Agency. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1976, § I, at I, 
col. 6. (Even the executive branch has its problems with secrecy. One of the nation's 
most spectacular leaks, which originated in the executive branch, was the publication of 
the Pentagon Papers in June, 1971. See E. SHEEHAN, THE PENTAGON PAPERS ix (1971).) 
But this concern is insufficient to overcome the constitutional mandate for congressional 
control of war making. Further, in cases involving truly sensitive information, some 
accommodation involving disclosure of the critical data to a few selected congressional 
leaders would surely evolve. In the extraordinary circumstances justifying a President's 
unilateral use of war making force, it is almost inconceivable that Congress would order 
withdrawal of committed American forces if an informed congressional leadership assured 
the American people that such a commitment of forces was necessary. 
93. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) on problems of 
withdrawal. See also Note, st/pra note 5, at 1776, on Congress' reluctance to oppose the 
President once hostilities have begun - the fait accompli problem. 
94. War Powers Resaltltian, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). The Resolution 
was synthesi2ed from H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and S. 440, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1973). It is titled a resolution instead of an act in deference to the original 
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gress' control over United States military activity. It contains four major 
provisions: first, a broad definition of the military activity which it 
attempts to regulate; second, strict limits on presidential initiation of 
such activity; third, procedures for requiring the termination of such 
activity when not approved by Congress; and, fourth, consultation and 
reporting requirements to keep Congress well informed. The Resolu-
tion also contains a fifth, less important, set of provisions concerning 
interpretation of the Resolution, war related legislation and United 
States treaties. In the five sections which follow, the four major pro-
visions and the interpretation provisions will be summarized and 
evaluated. The evaluation will proceed on three levels. First, the pro-
visions will be analyzed in terms of the Constitution's allocation of 
power over peacetime deployments and war threatening actions. Second, 
insofar as they apply to war, the provisions will be evaluated in terms 
of the Constitution's requirement of congressional authorization of war 
- either express, implied, or presumed. Finally, careful attention will 
be given to any effect the various provisions might have on the role of 
the courts in deciding disputes which could arise in the war powers 
area.1l5 
The Breadth of Coverage of the Resolution 
The Resolution describes in broad terms military activity it is intended 
to govern: 
It is the purpose of this joint resolution ... to insure that the 
collective judgment of the Congress and the President will apply 
to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, 
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of 
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.96 
"[H]ostilities" and "situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances" are the key definitional 
House version which was designed to "elaborate" on the war powers rather than give an 
"itemized definition" of them. See H.R. REp. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973). 
Despite its tide, Congress treated the Resolution as an enactment of law in passing it over 
President Nixon's veto. 
95. For other discussions of the Resolution see Note, I973 War Powers Resolution: 
Congress Re-Asserts Its Warmaking Power, Loy. CHI. L.J. 83 (1974); Statutory Comment, 
The War Powers Resolution: Statutory Limitation on the Commander-in-Chiej, II HARv. 
J. LEGIS. 181 (1974). 
96. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
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phrases. The breadth of these phrases turns on the meaning of the 
word "hostilities". The term is not defined in the Resolution itself but 
the Resolution's legislative history shows that "hostilities" includes 
both "armed conflict" and ua state of confrontation in which no shots 
have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed 
conflict." 91 The legislative history then describes "imminent hostilities" 
as a situation in which there is a "clear potential" for "hostilities." 08 
Thus the Resolution's key definitional phrase encompasses all military 
activity involving even a "clear potential" for a "state of confrontation 
in which there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict." 
The phrase is made even more inclusive by a special provision in the 
Resolution elaborating the meaning of "introduction of United States 
Armed Forces": 
... the term 'introduction of United States Armed Forces' in-
cludes the assignment of members of such armed forces to com-
mand, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany 
the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or 
government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists 
an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged in hos-
tilities.99 
Thus the Resolution attempts to regulate even the assignment of ad-
visors to foreign military forces faced with merely a "clear potential" 
for such a "state of confrontation." 
To illustrate the breadth of the Resolution's coverage in concrete 
terms, the following are examples of recent executive uses of force 
which would have been covered by the Resolution: President Eisen-
hower's deployment of troops to Lebanon;loo President Kennedy's 
blockade of Cuba;lOl President Johnson's deployment of troops to the 
Dominican Republic;lo2 and the initial advisory activity in Vietnam.loa 
President Nixon's "incursion" into Cambodialo4 was arguably an 
expansion of the Vietnam War that would have merited independent 
regulation under the Resolution.lo5 Both the rescue of the MayaguezlOO 
97. H.R.REp. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st 5ess. 7 (1973). 
98. Id. 
99. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 8(c), 87 5tat. 555 (1973). 
100. See War Without Declaration, supra note II, at 514180. 
101. ld. at 514181. 
102. ld. 
103. ld. 
104. ld. 
105. For a discussion of when a radical change in the character of war operations 
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and the evacuation of the Vietnamese Refugees in the Spring of 1975107 
did fall within the Resolution's coverage. 
This broad coverage creates significant constitutional difficulties, 
particularly with regard to control of peacetime deployments and war 
threatening actions. As noted earlier, the critical factors in determining 
whether a use of force is a peacetime deployment, war threatening 
action or act of war are its magnitude and political content.lOS Once a 
particular use of force has been classified by means of these two criteria, 
it can then be determined if Congress can prevent or halt that use of 
force. Only if a use of force is of such magnitude and political content 
that it constitutes war does it require congressional authorization. If 
the use of force is merely a peacetime deployment, Congress can assert 
no control over it whatsoever, and, if the use of force is war threatening, 
Congress can control it only through political struggle with the Presi-
dent. Political struggle may, however, include use of the appropriations 
power.109 
The War Powers Resolution, by including under its regulations all 
uses of force which entail armed conflict or the clear potential for it,l1O 
purports to impose congressional control over all three categories of 
military action. Peacetime deployments, despite their small scale and 
apolitical character, might involve a clear potential for limited armed 
conflict or even an actual exchange of firePl War threatening actions 
by definition involve at least a clear potential for armed conflict. Thus, 
the Resolution attempts to subject some peacetime deployments and all 
war threatening actions to direct congressional control. 
requires special authorization, see Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 
1973) rev'd 484 F.zd 1307 (zd Cir. 1973); DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.zd II46 (zd Cir. 
1973); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 540 (N.D. Cal. 1970) rev'd 464 F.zd 178 
(9th Cir. 1972). 
106. See War Powers: A Ten of Compliance, Hearings before the Subcomm. on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1975) (President Ford's report in compliance with 
section 4(a)(I) of the War Powers Resolution) [hereinafter Compliance Hearings]. 
107. Id. at 4, 5-6, 7. 
108. See Figure I at note 34 supra, and accompanying discussion. 
109. These three stages of congressional power are described respectively in text at notes 
7-21, 24-34, and 35-46 supra. 
1I0. In the discussions below, military activity which the Resolution attempts to 
regulate will be described as "military activity involving armed conflict or the clear 
potential for it." This shorthand description is intended to convey the broad scope of the 
Resolution's coverage. At the same time, it is probably less inclusive than the Resolution's 
own wording. 
1 II. See text at note 34 supra. 
80 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 18 
The Resolution's Initiation Provisions 
The Resolution states that the President may initiate military activity 
involving armed conflict or the clear potential for it112 only pursuant to: 
I) a declaration of war, 2) specific statutory authorization, or 3) a 
national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its 
territory or possessions, or its armed forces.u3 This allows the President 
to act without prior express congressional approval only in the event 
of an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its 
armed forces, and the attack must have created a "national emergency." 
This provision poses severe constitutional problems with regard to 
executive use of force short of war. Since the Resolution applies to all 
war threatening force, 114 these criteria would, if valid, deprive the 
President of all power to initiate war threatening actions except in the 
enumerated situations. Since these situations do not exhaust the set of 
circumstances in which war threatening force might be used, they 
impermissibly intrude on the President's authority to use war threaten· 
ing force without congressional authorization. Further, the initiation 
provisions could operate to deny the President authority to order some 
peacetime deployments, for, as noted earlier, peacetime deployments 
can sometimes come within the broad ambit of the Resolution's cover· 
age.u5 This application of the Resolution is even more clearly uncon· 
stitutional. 
The initiation provisions are also subject to constitutional attack in 
their attempt to regulate war. Although the Resolution's initiation 
provisions recognize the presumed authorization of war that arises from 
the direct attack situation, they attempt an exhaustive enumeration of 
the situations in which a rebuttable presumption of authorization might 
arise, i.e., attacks on American territories, possessions, and troops. The 
Constitution, however, allows such a presumption to arise during any 
"grave emergency" which the President has good reason to believe 
would cause Congress to authorize war if it had time to consider the 
situation.u6 For example, if Canada were subjected to an unexpected 
attack by a mutual enemy, a presumption would certainly arise which 
II2. As discussed in note IIO supra, "military activity involving armed conflict or the 
clear potential for it" is the shorthand phrase that will be used in these discussions to 
describe the range of actions which the Resolution attempts to regulate. 
II3. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(C), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
II4. See text at note III supra. 
lIS. [d. 
II 6. See text at note 78 supra. 
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would enable the President to assist Canada's resistance by use of war 
making force. The Resolution's initiation provisions bar the President 
from rendering such assistance save pursuant to a declaration of war or 
specific statutory authorization. 
It is true that under the Constitution Congress can rebut the pre-
sumption arising from a grave threat situation once it has had time to 
evaluate that situation. After such consideration, Congress can then 
issue an order legally binding the President to disengage American 
forces.117 However, the nature of the situations which give rise to the 
rebuttable presumption requires that congressional rebuttal of such 
presumed authorization be accomplished on an ad hoc basis after assess-
ment of the circumstances of the particular situation involved,11s It is 
conceivable that Congress could with regard to a particular "emer-
gency," rebut a presumption by the President of congressional authori-
zation to make war prior to its inv<?cation,119 Congress cannot, however, 
issue a blanket prohibition against all future presumptions of congres-
sional authorization to engage in war during "grave emergencies." Any 
such blanket proscription would, in the words of the D.C. Circuit, 
leave the nation "paralyzed." 120 The Resolution's initiation provisions 
attempt, with the exception of the four enumerated authorizations, just 
such a blanket prohibition and are therefore unconstitutional. Indeed, 
the initiation provisions attempt to restrict the presumption of authori-
zation of war in grave threat situations so severely that some members 
of Congress who debated the Resolution considered these provisions to 
be merely a preamble.121 
Ironically, a primary effect of the initiation provisions may be to 
increase the power of the President, since they seem to authorize war 
in any national emergency created by attack on United States terri-
II7. See text at note 92 supra. 
II8. See text at notes 9<>-91 supra. 
II9. For example, Congress might antlClpate the possibility of a flare-up in the 
Middle East and forbid United States military intervention in advance. This is essentially 
what occurred in relation to anticipated presidential action in Angola in 1976. See N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 20, 1975, at I, col. I; N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1976, at 18, col. 5; N.Y. Times 
Jan. 28, 1976, at I, col. 8, for a contemporary account of the course of the struggle 
between the President and Congress regarding U.S.-financed covert operations in Angola. 
120. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
121. CoNG. !tEe. SI8,992--96 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (remarks of Senator Eagleton, 
D.-Mo.); htlt compare id. at SI8,986 (remarks of Senator Javits, R.-N.Y.). Congress may 
have confirmed this preamble theory when it failed to object to President Ford's use of 
force to rescue Americans D;om Vietnam and Cambodia and to rescue the Mayaguez from 
its Cambodian captors. All of the incidents involved armed conflict but none had advance 
congressional authorization. See Compliance Hearings, Stlpra note 106. 
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tories, possessions, or troopS.122 A shot across the bow of a PT boat 
could be used by the President to justify making war under such 
provisions.123 While it is true that to satisfy the Resolution such an 
incident would have to be a "national emergency," Congress and the 
courts have historically deferred to a President's factual claims con-
cerning hostile foreign actions and to his subsequent assertions of the 
existence of a "national emergency." 124 This pattern of deference could 
translate the Resolution's initiation provisions into implied authoriza-
tion of almost any war effort which a President might undertake in 
connection with a crisis involving United States troops or possessions.12G 
Indeed, several congressmen expressed opposition to the Resolution on 
precisely these grounds.126 
It could be answered that the Resolution's reference to "national 
emergency" essentially restricts presidential war making to situations 
where Congress would have given its approval. In other words, the 
Resolution arguably does no more than recognize the rebuttable grave 
threat presumption in specified circumstances. This construction is 
bolstered by Section 8(d) (2) which declares that nothing in the Reso-
lution should be construed to give the President any authority which he 
would not have had in its absence.127 
122. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c)(3), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
123. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a response to alleged attacks by the North 
Vietnamese on two United States destroyers. 
124. See e.g. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29-32 (1827). An excellent 
contemporary example is the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. On the basis of presidential alle-
gations Congress described the North Vietnamese as having "deliberately and repeatedly 
attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters" and as 
having "created a serious threat to international peace." II2 CONGo REc. 1841 (1964). 
Congress was probably misled by the President. See The Gull 01 Tonkin, tIle 1964 
Incidents, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968) (testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense). 
125. This arguably would be an abdication by Congress of its responsibility to control 
war making. See Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, ,tlSticiable, and /tlris-
dictionally Attackable, 16 !UN. L. REv. 449 (1968); Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The 
President verstls the Constitution, in 2 THE VIETNAM \VAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 7II 
(R. Falk ed. 1969); War Power Legislation Hearings on S. 731, S.,. Res. 18 and S.,. Res. 
59 before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 549, 554-55, 
560-63 (1972) (testimony of Alexander M. Bickel). But the Supreme Court seems to 
view almost any delegation of authority by Congress to the President in the area of 
foreign affairs to be proper. United States V. CurtiSS-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
324 (1936); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. V. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1951). See 
also Jones, The President, Congress, and Foreign Relations, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 575 
(1941). 
126. See II9 CONGo REc. SI8,992-94 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (remarks of Senator 
Eagleton, D.-Mo.); Eagleton, A Dangerous Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1973 at 39, col. 3 
(city ed.). 
127. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 8(d) (2), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
I977/ Curbing the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution 83 
Even granting the conceptual validity of this argument, a President 
may, as a practical matter, find it easier to engage in war making under 
the explicit language of the Resolution than he would if acting pursuant 
to a more nebulous rebuttable presumption of authorization.128 Con-
sequendy, fears of increased presidential power as a result of the 
Resolution cannot be dismissed. 
In summary, the Resolution's initiation provisions state that the 
President can employ military force involving armed conflict or the 
clear potential for it without prior congressional approval only in the 
event of a national emergency created by an armed attack on the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. This is un-
constitutional insofar as applied to peacetime deployments or war-
threatening actions. The initiation provisions are also unconstitutional 
insofar as they are intended to negative presumed authorization of 
war in grave threat situations other than those involving American 
troops or possessions. Finally, as a practical matter, the initiation 
provisions dangerously increase the potential for independent presi-
dential war making by seeming to authorize war in a large number of 
situations. 
The Resolution's Termination Provisions 
The Resolution provides for the termination of all military activity 
involving armed conflict or the clear potential for it after a maximum of 
sixty days of deliberation. It employs two termination provisions to 
achieve this end. 
The first is the sixty day cut off provision contained in Section S(b). 
If the President uses military force involving armed conflict or the 
clear potential for it in the absence of a declaration of war, he must 
report his actions to Congress within forty-eight hours.129 If Congress 
has not already authorized this use of force with specific legislation and 
does not either enact such legislative authorization or declare war 
within sixty days, the President must terminate the military activity.130 
If the President certifies to Congress that he needs time to withdraw 
safely the armed forces he has deployed, Congress can give him up to 
thirty days to do SO.131 Under this provision, Congress' failure to enact 
128. See text at note 78 supra. 
129. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 4(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
130. rd. § 5(b). 
131. ld. 
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authorization suffices to obligate the President to terminate his use of 
force. Since termination, consequently, is required even absent a specific 
congressional vote of opposition, the President's veto power is cir~ 
cumvented. A simple majority of Congress can, therefore, successfully 
terminate executive war making by voting against the passage of any 
authorization bill. 
A second termination provision is contained in Section 5 ( c). Here, 
Congress provides itself with authority to order the President by con~ 
current resolution to withdraw immediately "armed forces engaged in 
hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and 
territories." 132 Since a concurrent resolution is merely an expression of 
the majority will of both houses of Congress, it does not go to the 
President for his signature. Thus, the President's veto power is again 
circumvented. 
These two termination provisions are coupled with priority proce~ 
dures designed to insure swift congressional action.1a3 Once the Presi~ 
dent reports a use of force to Congress, any member of Congress can 
introduce a bill supporting or opposing the President's actions. Under 
the Resolution's procedures, any such bill would move swiftly through 
committee, and would be submitted to a vote by the full Congress 
within a maximum of sixty days. These procedures serve to answer 
the objection that war can be terminated by congressional inaction. 
They operate to insure that any bill which would authorize executive 
war making will be considered and voted on in some form by both 
houses.134 
The main effect of the Resolution's termination provisions is to 
expeditiously transform congressional nonapproval of military activity 
into a legal obligation to halt such activity. The Resolution attempts to 
accomplish this result by making continuation of unapproved military 
activity beyond its deadlines unlawful. This creates several constitu~ 
tional difficulties. 
First, there is the problem of congressional regulation of peacetime 
deployments and war threatening actions which has been discussed 
132. ld. § 5(c). 
133. rd. §§ 6,7. 
134. The Resolution allows suspension of these priority procedures, however, by voice 
vote. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, §§ 6(a)-(c), 7 (a)-(c), 87 Stat. 
(1973). Using a voice vote to delay beyond the sixty day limit a vote by roll call on an 
authomation bill would enable individual congressmen to avoid personal accountability 
for their failure to authome a controversial presidential action. 
I977/ Curhing the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution 85 
above.13G As noted at that point, any congressional attempt to regulate 
peacetime deployments would be unconstitutional.136 Of more interest 
would be an application of the termination provisions to war threaten-
ing actions. In view of the shared nature of authority over war 
threatening actions, any attempt by Congress to legally bind the 
President simply by a majority vote to terminate such activity would be 
invalid.137 
However, if the Resolution's procedures and the resulting order to 
terminate are interpreted as merely facilitating the expression of con-
gressional will for the purpose of exerting political pressure on the 
President, their application to war threatening actions would be valid. 
Unified and unambiguous congressional opposition might itself be 
enough to force the President to end such a use of force. A public 
outcry might accompany Congress' opposition and pressure the Presi-
dent into disengagement or encourage Congress to employ more effec-
tive means of opposition such as a cut-off of appropriations. All of these 
potential effects of congressional utilization of the termination pro-
visions would be constitutional. But efforts under the Resolution to 
force the termination of war threatening force by means of a legally 
binding order to the President would be unconstitutional. 
The second constitutional difficulty with the termination provisions 
involves their effect on actual war making. As has been shown, there 
are two types of presumed authorization of war - one irrebuttable and 
the other rebuttable - and the termination provisions' treatment of 
each presents different problems. 
The Resolution, in its initiation provisions, recognizes the irrebuttable 
presumption arising from the direct attack situation. However, the 
Resolution would allow Congress to force the President to stop de-
fending the nation against direct attack. Congress simply does not 
have the authority to order the termination of such defensive actions 
by a President.13B While it is most unlikely that Congress would ever 
wish to abandon one or more of the States to foreign invasion, it is 
conceivable that in the midst of a war effort, defense of part of the 
nation might have to be abandoned for tactical reasons. That decision, 
135. Set: text at notes 29-33 and 39-44 supra. 
I36. Set: text at notes 29-33 supra. 
I37. Set: text at note 54 supra. 
I38. Set: text at note 75 supra. 
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however, must be made by the President as Commander-in-Chief, not 
by the Congress.l39 
This constitutional restriction on congressional authority does not 
apply to grave threat situations which give rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of authorization, even if those situations involve defense of 
United States' possessions, territories or troopS.140 Congress can order 
the President to terminate a war effort in such situations, and he must 
make a good faith attempt to withdraw from the hostilities.141 How-
ever, despite Congress' recognized authority in these situations, three 
constitutional objections might be made to the Resolution's treatment of 
them. 
It might first be argued that the President can make war in grave 
threat situations, in spite of congressional opposition, if he possesses 
sensitive information or special expertise which make his judgment 
superior to that of Congress.142 While this argument is not without 
support, it has been examined above143 and should be rejected. 
The second possible objection to the termination provisions is that by 
forcing Congress to approve or disapprove of presidential war making 
within sixty days, they unconstitutionally restrict Congress' ability to 
review and respond to grave threat situations in an ad hoc manner. In 
response to this objection, it can first be noted that the termination pro-
visions do not prevent Congress from evaluating each situation on its 
own merits. Secondly, while they do seem to limit the time which 
Congress can spend evaluating anyone situation to sixty days, there is 
nothing in the Resolution to prevent Congress from giving itself more 
time by authorizing a President's use of force temporarily.144 This 
would allow Congress to consider the war making itself more exten-
sively or to put continued pressure on the President to end his use of 
force without resorting to overt confrontation.145 A temporary authori-
I39. Ii. 
I40. See text at note 92 stlpra. 
I4I. What constitutes good faith withdrawal from hostilities is a difficult question. See 
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II, 6I6 (D.C. Cir. I973). 
I42. See Monaghan, stlpra note 5, at 3I-33: "The doctrine of separation of powers 
should, at least in the area of foreign affairs, be viewed as essentially a political, not a 
legal, construct. ••• Any attempt to circumscribe on constitutional grounds the president's 
power to use the armed forces abroad confuses political with constitutional issues." See 
note 92 stlpra. 
I43. See note 92 supra. 
I44. The Resolution does require that authorization be "specific." War Powers Resolu-
tion, Pub. L. No. 93-I48, § 8 (a) (I), 87 Stat. 555 (I973). A time limit would be a 
reasonable element of specificity. 
I45. Congress often is constrained by the perception that conflicts between it and the 
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zation is to some degree, however, an imprimatur,146 and by forcing 
Congress in some situations to resort to its use, the termination pro-
visions do restrict Congress' political options somewhat. But the judg-
ment of whether they limit the political options of Congress too 
severdy can only be reached by balancing the loss of political flexibility 
against the gain of decisive action. Congress more than any other 
branch of government is in a position to evaluate the factors involved. 
In imposing a sixty day limit on its consideration of grave threat situa-
tions, Congress has struck the balance in favor of decisive action. Its 
judgment on this issue should be honored.147 
The third and perhaps most substantial objection to the termination 
provisions is that they require American forces to be withdrawn from 
hostilities under time pressures which might make safe withdrawal 
impossible. Withdrawal of American forces from hostilities is required 
either upon the failure by Congress to authorize within sixty days the 
hostilities in question148 or upon the passage by Congress of a con-
current resolution ordering withdrawal even before the sixty days have 
expired.149 At such a point American involvement in a war effort 
might have become so pervasive and intense that an orderly and safe 
withdrawal of American forces would not be immediatdy possible. 
This problem could be remedied in some cases by the use of the 
provision in Section 5 (b) of the Resolution under which Congress can 
give the President up to thirty days to make a staged withdrawal from 
unauthorized hostilities.15o But situations may still arise in which the 
President has run out of time to end American involvement in a conflict 
but immediate withdrawal of American forces would result in greater 
casualties than would a more prolonged withdrawal. 
In such situations it would seem that the President's only obligation 
would be to make a good faith effort to end the United States involve-
ment as quickly as possible. This, of course, would not justify conduct-
ing a protracted withdrawal in order to further some foreign policy 
President "discourage the confidence of our allies and encourage the actions of our 
enemies." Note, Stlpra note 5, at 1796. 
146. Once approval of war making has been expressed, even if in limited terms, it is 
difficult to recant. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution unleashed a war machine that Congress 
was powerless to control. See u.s. Commitments to Foreign Powers, Hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 
and S. REp. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
147. See Cox, supra note 92, at 221. 
148. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(b), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
149. /d. § 5(C). 
150. ld. § 5(b). 
88 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 18 
objective since Congress presumably rejected such a course of action 
when it ordered immediate withdrawal. But it would allow the Presi· 
dent to withdraw in a manner perceived by him to involve the least risk 
of American casualties. 
It is, however, very unlikely that this problem would ever develop. 
By the time American forces became so deeply involved in a conflict 
that their immediate withdrawal would be impossible, Congress would 
be very reluctant to order an end to the hostilities.15i One of the strengths 
of the Resolution is that it forces Congress to act quickly with regard to 
American military involvements so that an order to terminate can be 
given before the situation gets out of control. 
Swift and decisive congressional action under the Resolution's 
termination provisions has another important effect. It increases the 
possibility of judicial resolution of disputes over military activity. Once 
Congress has clearly declared its opposition to a particular military 
activity, constitutional principles come into play which should govern 
disputes over the continuation of that activity.1G2 If it were clear that 
either Congress or more likely the President were acting unlawfully in 
such a dispute, it might be appropriate for a court to condemn the 
unlawful conduct. The dispute would have to be presented to the court 
as a genuine controversy ripe for adjudication by parties with legally 
protected interests in its outcome.153 The court would have to be able 
151. This is another manifestation of the fait accompli problem. See notes 92 and 145 
st/pra. 
152. These principles, derived from the constitutional analysis already presented, may 
be stated simply. The President has exclusive control over peacetime deployments, and 
Congress may not interfere with them even through the appropriations process. War-
threatening uses of force are subject to the joint control of the President and the Congress, 
permitting the President to employ such force without congressional authorization and 
permitting the Congress to limit their use by use of the appropriations power or other 
means available to it. War ean only be initiated pursuant to congressional authorization, 
express, implied or presumed. In cases of presumed authorization of the rebuttable type, 
war must be terminated when opposed by Congress. 
153. This aspect of justiciability involves both the article III "case and controversy" 
restriction on judicial power and the court made "rules of practice" designed to postpone 
judicial resolution of issues that could be more "prudently" handled under different 
circumstances. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 
520-35 (1966). A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Functional as well as 
constitutional considerations are involved. 
On the requirement of genuine controversy, see generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, 
D. SHAPmo, & H. WECHSLER, HART & \VECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 102-20 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Scharpf, SIIpra. 
As to ripeness, see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra at 120-49; Davis, Ripeness 0/ 
Governmental Action for Jt/dicial Review, 68 HARV. L. REv. II22 (1955); Scharpf, SIIpra. 
Standing is considered in HART & WECHSLER, st/pra at 150-214; Davis, The Liberalized 
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. 
REv. 633 (1971); Scharpf, Stlpra. 
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to ascertain and evaluate the relevant facts, to discover manageable 
standards for resolution of the issues, and to administer a meaningful 
remedy on behalf of the aggrieved party.1M While it might be a rare 
occurrence for all of these conditions to be satisfied in a dispute over 
military activity, it is possible to conceive of several such lawsuits. 
For example, a soldier might petition for habeas corpus to prevent 
his deployment to an unauthorized war;155 a congressman might seek 
an injunction to enforce congressional opposition to a war or at least a 
declaratory judgment to ratify the binding nature of Congress' opposi~ 
tion;lG6 the Comptroller General might seek to enjoin the Secretary of 
Defense from violating congressional spending limitations.157 Each 
of these examples presents a controversy which is real and mature. 
Each of the parties can satisfy a test for standing imposed in the past.158 
If it is assumed that the military activity in each case clearly falls into 
one of the peacetime deployments, war threatening actions or war 
categories, there should be no significant factual disputesl59 and the 
legal standards to be applied will be judicially manageable: war con~ 
tinued in the fact of congressional opposition is unlawful;160 appropria~ 
tions limitations, unless they interfere with peacetime deployments 
must be obeyed.161 Finally, the remedies sought might be effective 
means to resolve the controversies at hand. Freeing individual soldiers 
from their duty to report to battle might be a quick and simple way to 
154. The political question doctrine addresses more the suitability of a particular issue 
for judicial resolution than the suitability of a particular case. The doctrine can best be 
analyzed in functional terms: are the means available to the judiciary sufficient to actually 
resolve the issue presented? See Scharpf, supra note 153. Other interpretations have been 
given to the doctrine, but these alternate explanations seem less satisfying. Compare 
'Vechsler, Toward Netltral Principles of Constittltional Law, 73 HhRV. L. REv. I (1959) 
with L. H.um, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958) and A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH (1962). 
155. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (serviceman with orders 
to fight in Vietnam challenging the legality of the war). 
156. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II (D.C. Cir. 1973) (congressmen seeking 
declaratory judgment and injunction against the Vietnam War); Compare with Holtzman 
v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (congressmen challenging the bombing of 
Cambodia held not to have standing). 
157. Compare with, e.g., At1ee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) afYd 4II 
U.S. 9II (1973) (suit to enjoin expenditures by Secretary of Defense for Vietnam War). 
158. See notes 153, 155-57 supra. 
159. Whether a use of force is a peacetime deployment, war threatening or war making 
in character depends upon questions of fact or questions of evaluation of fact which will 
often be impossible to resolve. The passage of time, however, can serve to clarify the 
nature of a particular military situation. United States involvement in Vietnam exemplifies 
this well. 
160. See text at note 92 stlpra. 
161. See text at notes 44-45 supra. 
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end a war.162 Rendering a declaratory judgment ratifying the binding 
authority of congressional opposition to a war might be the critical 
factor in forcing a President to comply with Congress' will.loa Uphold-
ing a spending limitation could lay to rest a presidential claim to 
exclusive authority over a war threatening action, while striking down 
a spending limitation could end congressional interference with a peace-
time deployment. 
It is clear, then, that the termination provisions do provide some 
basis for an increase in judicial resolution of disputes over allocation of 
the war power. However, many such disputes will still be beyond the 
reach of the courts. It is likely, for example, that a contested military 
action would not fit neatly into one of the peacetime deployments, war 
threatening actions, or war categories and thus would not be susceptible 
to the application of manageable standards.lo4 It is possible that the 
remedies available to a court would aggravate rather than assist the 
resolution of a particular controversy.lOG And it will often be the case 
that war powers disputes will involve war threatening force and thus 
require political resolution until they reach the stage of presidential 
defiance of a cut-off of appropriations.166 
In summary, the termination provisions of the Resolution force 
Congress to act decisively in response to presidential uses of force. 
When the response is disapproval, these provisions validly operate 
either to impose a legal obligation on the President to terminate war 
making in grave threat situations or to help orchestrate Congress' 
political opposition to war threatening actions. However, congressional 
interference which might result from these provisions with either peace-
time deployments or defense against direct attack on the nation would 
be unconstitutional. Finally, the termination provisions increase to some 
extent the possibility of judicial resolution of disputes concerning the 
nation's war power. 
The Resolution's Consultation and Reporting Provisions 
The Resolution contains consultation and reporting provisions de-
162. It could also be disastrous. In Mitchdl v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
the Vietnam War was declared unlawful but the mode of withdrawal was left to the 
President's discretion. 
163. It is far more difficult for a President to defy a confirmed legal obligation than to 
defy mcre political opposition from Congress. 
164. See note 154 supra. 
165. See Mitchdl v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6II (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
166. See text at notes 39-43 supra. 
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signed to keep Congress sufficiently informed to exercise the control 
over United States military activity which the Resolution entrusts to 
it. Under Section 3, the President must consult with Congress in "every 
possible instance" 167 before initiating military activity involving armed 
conflict or the clear potential for it. The President must consult "reg-
ularly" with Congress while such military activity continues. The 
process of consultation, according to the Resolution's legislative history, 
should involve a genuine interchange of ideas and not merely a report 
of information.16s 
Under Section 4 the President must report to Congress any initiation 
of military activity involving armed conflict or the clear potential for 
it169 and any significant deployment or build up of United States 
Armed Forces abroad.170 The report must be made within forty-eight 
hours of the President's use or deployment of troops171 and must set 
forth the authority under which the President acted and the estimated 
scope and duration of his actions.l72 In addition, the President may be 
required to report any other information that "Congress may request 
in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to 
the committing of the Nation to war and to the use of United States 
Armed Forces abroad." 173 The President is relieved of these reporting 
obligations only if Congress has declared war.174 
These provisions respond to Congress' legitimate need for informa-
tion concerning United States military activity. Congress' war powers 
and its other grants of authority cannot be responsibly exercised without 
the relevant war related information.175 However, there is the counter-
vailing consideration of the President's recognized needs for secrecy 
in the conduct of foreign and military affairS.176 While it is certain 
that basic information pertinent to war making should not be withheld 
from Congress, it is by no means clear that all war related data should 
be disclosed to the whole of Congress. Indeed, in situations where, due 
to its institutional incapacity for rapid complex decision making, Con-
167. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 3, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
168. H.R. REp. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6--7 (1973). 
169. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 4 (a) (I), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
170. ltl. § 4 (a) (2)-(3). 
171. ltl. § 4(a). 
172. rd. § 4(a)(A), (B), (C). 
173. rd. § 4(b). 
174. rd. § 4(a). 
175. See note 92 supra. 
176. ld. 
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gress would have litde use for sensitive information, it would seem 
that disclosure by the President should not be required. With all of 
these competing considerations present at one time or another, it is in-
evitable that disputes will arise over access to war related information.177 
In theory, the consultation provisions seem to indicate that such 
disputes over information would be legal disputes which a court could 
resolve.178 Whatever the validity of that view, it is clear as a practical 
matter that such disputes should be resolved through the political 
process. Congress can hardly use the courts to force the President to 
report on matters about which Congress has no knowledge. Nor could 
the courts hope to tell the President and Congress how they should 
consult with one another. Finally, if the President reports a use of force 
but refuses to divulge his reasons for it, or reports inaccurate or incom-
plete information, congressional disapproval of his actions and various 
political sanctions are available to force the President to act more 
cooperatively. 
In summary, the consultation and reporting provisions serve legiti-
mate congressional needs for information but may conflict with valid 
presidential requirements for secrecy. Further, Congress' inability to 
make complex decisions swifdy militates against the extensive degree 
of consultation mandated by the Resolution. It is certain that disputes 
will arise over access to war related information but these disputes 
should be resolved by political means rather than by any legal formulae 
which might be derived from the terms of the Resolution's consultation 
and reporting provisions. 
The Resolution's Interpretation Provisions 
The Resolution contains several provisions concerning interpretation 
of the Resolution itself, of other war related legislation, and of United 
States treaties. While these sections raise virtually no constitutional 
problems, they do have an impact on the exercise of the war power 
and thus merit brief discussion. The first is Section 8(a) (I) which 
elaborates the meaning of "specific statutory authorization." In order for 
legislation to specifically authorize military activity involving armed 
I77. This has been the primary difficulty under the Resolution thus far. See Com-
pliance Hearings, supra note I06, at 53-88. 
I78. The Resolution employs the word "shall." War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 
93-I48, § 3, 87 Stat. 555 (I973)· 
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conflict or the clear potential for it, the legislation must I) be specific 
and 2) explicitly refer to the War Powers Resolution.179 Unfortunately, 
it is not clear from the Resolution or its legislative history how specific 
a "specific statutory authorization" must be. Furthermore, no matter 
how specific a presently existing statutory authorization might be, it is 
impossible for it to contain a reference to the War Powers Resolution 
of 1973 if it was enacted before 1973. 
The requirement of specificity grows out of a history of presidential 
claims to war making authority under the general language of various 
United States treaties and resolutions and out of the tendency of courts 
to treat appropriations for Vietnam as authorization of that war. The 
language of treaties and resolutions is often general in nature so that 
it can express policies of the United States without committing the 
nation to specific actions which in the future might become undesir-
able.1so Appropriations bills are often passed by Congress not because 
Congress approves of a war but because it fears endangering the safety 
of troops already committed to battle.1s1 These actions by Congress are 
unsatisfactory means of authorizing war simply because they are not 
necessarily intended to have that effect. If Congress' intent were made 
clear there would be no difficulty.1s2 Thus, the Resolution should be 
interpreted as requiring merely that authorizations of war manifest a 
clear intent to confer war making power. Any further requirements, 
such as time limits, area limits, or purpose limits, might in some situa-
tions create an unnecessary burden of detail in an area fraught with 
complexity .lS3 
Applying this principle to legislation passed prior to the Resolution 
reveals that three "area resolutions" seem to empower the President to 
make war without further authorization from Congress: the "Formosa 
Resolution," 1S4 the "Middle East Resolution," 1S5 and the "Cuban 
179. Ii. § 8{a) (I). See S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1St Sess. 24 (I973). 
180. See Note, stlpra note 5, at 1800 (treaties), 1802 (resolutions). 
I8I. Ii. at I799-I800. 
182. ]d. at I803. 
I83. Of course, in some situations time limits, area limits, or purpose limits might be 
appropriate. See text at note I45 supra; Note, supra note 5, at I803. 
I84. 50 U.S.C. app. n. pree. § I (I970) {originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 84-4, 69 
Stat. 7 (I955»' The President is authorized "to employ the Armed Forces of the United 
States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa 
and the Pescadores against armed attack. ••• " 
I85. 22 U.S.C. § I962 (I970). "[I]f the President determines the necessity thereof, the 
United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation ••• requesting assistance 
against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism •••• " 
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Resolution." IS6 However, the requirement of specific reference to the 
War Powers Resolution remains. The Resolution's legislative history 
indicates that Congress must reconsider these prior authorizations to 
sustain their validity.1S7 
A similar analysis must be made of United States treaties. It is 
complicated, however, by two additional provisions of the Resolution. 
Section 8 (a) (2) requires that a treaty, in order to constitute an authori-
zation of war making, must be accompanied by implementing legisla-
tion which I) is specific and 2) refers explicitly to the War Powers 
Resolution.lss The purpose of this provision is to insure that the House 
of Representatives participates in the authorization process1SO and that 
grants of war making authority in treaties possess the same clarity of 
intent as such grants in legislation.loo However, Section 8(d) (I) states 
that the Resolution is not intended to alter the provisions of existing 
treaties.lOl If, absent the Resolution, existing United States treaties 
would have authorized war making by the President, such treaties argu-
ably should be exempt from the implementing legislation and specific 
authorization requirements of Section 8(a) (2). The weight of authority 
on this issue, however, is that no existing United States treaties em-
power the President to make war without further authorization from 
Congress.102 Thus the implementing legislation and specific authoriza-
tion requirements do not alter any existing treaties but merely specify 
how such treaties must be amended if they are to authorize war. 
There is one final provision of the Resolution to be discussed. Section 
8( d) (2) provides that nothing in the Resolution is intended to give the 
President any authority which he would not have had in the absence 
of the Resolution.193 This provision was briefly discussed above in the 
context of the Resolution's initiation provisions but merits further 
examination. Its apparent purpose was to assuage the fears of those 
members of Congress who viewed the Resolution as a license to the 
President to act even more independently in the use of military force 
186. Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697 (1962). The United States is determined "to 
prevent by whatever means necessary, including the use of arms, ••• [any Cuban aggres-
sion in the 'Vestern Hemisphere]." 
187. S. REp. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1973). 
188. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 8(a) (2), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
189. S. REp. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1973). 
190. ld. 
191. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 8(a)(I), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
192. See Note, supra note 5, at 1798-1801. 
193. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 8 (d) (2), 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
1977 / Curbing the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution 95 
than was possible absent the Resolution.194 The provision would have 
answered such fears if the balance of war making power between the 
President and Congress depended on legal principle. However, since 
most uses of force are war threatening and not acts of war, control in 
the majority of cases depends on political power.195 
The Resolution increases Congress' political power by forcing it to 
act decisively in response to presidential war making.196 But the Reso-
lution also weakens Congress by limiting Congress' political options.197 
Under the Resolution, Congress may not maintain a neutral posture for 
longer than sixty days in order to evaluate the information, policies and 
events involved in a particular military engagement unless temporary 
authorization is given, which is itself a form of congressional approval. 
It may not delay decision in the face of a presidential claim that more 
data is available for Congress' consideration. It may not oppose the 
President in ways more subtle and potentially less damaging to an 
ongoing military effort than an overt declaration of the illegality of that 
effort.1us Although the end result is uncertain, history seems to indicate 
that when Congress is faced with an absolute "yes" or "no" decision 
regarding an assertedly necessary use of force, approval is the likely 
result.1U9 Once a military adventure receives initial congressional ap-
proval, it can be almost impossible to contain.200 It will thus take a 
vigilant Congress to prevent the fear of inflated presidential power from 
becoming a reality. 
CONCLUSION 
While the War Powers Resolution may be unconstitutional in some 
of its possible applications, especially with regard to peacetime deploy-
ments and war threatening actions, it could prove to be a useful tool 
for increasing Congress' participation in the decisions which commit 
the United States to war. By forcing Congress to act decisively in 
response to presidential uses of force, the Resolution insures that the 
194. See note 126 Stlpra. 
195. See text at notes 35-46 supra. 
196. See text at notes 133-34 Stlpra. 
197. See text at notes 144-47 Stlpra. 
198. Congress is often constrained by the perception that conflicts between it and the 
President "discourage the confidence of our allies and encourage the actions of our 
enemies." Note, Stlpra note 5, at 1796. 
199. See notes 123-24 Stlpra and accompanying text. 
200. See note 146 supra. 
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legal status of actual war making will be clearly established and that 
disfavored war threatening actions will be subjected to the constraints 
of well orchestrated political pressure. This creates a tremendous incen~ 
tive for the President to cooperate with Congress and for Congress to 
take its role in United States military affairs seriously. It also makes 
possible judicial support for Congress' legitimate assertions of authority 
in the disputes that will inevitably arise over the limits of presidential 
power. 
President Ford has already complied with the Resolution on three 
occasions,201 and if nothing else this begins to establish a pattern of 
executive cooperation with the legislature concerning United States 
military ventures. Such a pattern is in marked contrast to the claims 
of independent authority that characterized the administrations of 
Truman through Nixon and the passive response by Congress at the 
time to those claims. Hopefully, cooperation between the President and 
Congress will become sufficiendy established to insure that the Dog of 
War will never be loosed without the consent of those who ultimately 
must pay its price. 
201. See Compliance Hearings, st/pra note 106, at 4-7. 
